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Exiled officer adds to Khadafy's worries

By JACK ANDERSON

LIBYAN dictator Moammar Khadafy, already on the ropes from a shattered economy and the fear of future American bombing raids, now has a potential knockout punch to worry about: open opposition by the man he most feared would challenge him.

Abdel Monelm Huni, one of the original dozen Libyan officers who helped Khadafy seize power in 1969, recently issued a call to his former army colleagues and others to overthrow the dictator.

Huni made his declaration from exile in Cairo, announcing at the same time the formation of a Libyan Committee for National Salvation. Thousands of leaflets bearing his call to arms were distributed throughout Libya.

Why is Huni's action significant? Because the army's support is crucial to any at-

tempted ouster of Khadafy, and Huni, unlike the exiles leading any of the two dozen earlier anti-Khadafy groups, has strong ties of friendship among army officers in Tripoli.

Last November, in fact, we identified Huni as "the man most likely to succeed Khadafy" — while the CIA was backing a loser, Mohammed Youssef Magari-eff. This English-speaking flashy dresser has consumed at least \$7 million in CIA and Saudi Arabian funding without any noticeable effect on Khadafy.

Once vice president, interior minister and intelligence chief, Huni was Khadafy's No. 3 man when he split in 1975 in disgust over the regime's corruption and Khadafy's persecution of dissidents and

minorities. Khadafy was so furious at Huni that he tried to have him assassinated in Cairo in 1976.

Since then Huni has lain low, resisting all suggestions that he lead the opposition against Khadafy. But last January he made a secret trip to Washington and conferred with Reagan administration officials.

Insiders described the talks as "inconclusive."

But they did establish two important policies: the U.S. would not oppose any attempt by Huni to unseat Khadafy, and there would be no CIA funds for him — which would have wrecked his chances for popular support in Libya.

In short, Huni was given free rein, but wouldn't have to carry the CIA on his back.

Following the U.S. raid on Libya in April, intelligence sources tell us Khadafy sent an urgent message to Huni in Cairo. He begged him to let bygones be bygones and to rejoin the ruling military council in Tripoli. It was an offer Huni could and did refuse, though he condemned the U.S. raid on his country.

Having observed Khadafy's erratic behavior since the bombing, Huni obviously felt the time was ripe to take his opposition out of mothballs. He timed his proclamation for Aug. 30, just before the 17th anniversary of the Libyan revolution on Sept. 1.

"No Libyan citizen who remains faithful to Libya [can] remain silent after today," Huni began.

"The majority of our citizens know that on the dawn of that day [Sept. 1, 1969], we did not represent

anything but the will of the people.

"The successive events and the activities of our 'comrade-in-arms,' Col. Moammar Khadafy, soon made clear to us the 'deviation' that he has followed due to his egotism, lust for power, weakness in the face of personal greed and personal hatred. . . .

"The freedom which was the first objective of our military uprising has changed to slavery, bondage, persecution [and] despotic dominion over every citizen who is honorable, honest and moral . . . We demand that Khadafy relinquish power immediately.

"I send this message to my free officers . . . all non-commissioned officers and soldiers. I ask them to move immediately to force Col. Khadafy to relinquish power and surrender authority."

Huni's open opposition could seal Khadafy's doom.